Temporary injunctions can protect a litigant against harm that may occur before a civil suit is decided. They are not, however, an automatic consequence of filing proceedings. Under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), the Court must assess whether the circumstances justify the particular protection sought.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Puri Terminal Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and others (2004 SCMR 1092) that an applicant must establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss or injury. Failure to establish any required limb justifies refusal. The Court must also consider equitable principles and statutory restrictions that may independently make an injunction inappropriate.
1. An Injunction Remains a Discretionary Remedy
In A.H.M. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd., Suit No. 1722 of 2018, order dated 28 January 2019, the Sindh High Court expressly recognised that relief may be refused even where the three ingredients otherwise appear satisfied. The applicant’s conduct and the legal limits of the remedy remain relevant.
The inquiry therefore concerns both the requirements for interim protection and any reason why granting the requested order would be unlawful, inequitable or disproportionate.
2. Circumstances in Which Temporary Injunctive Relief Should Be Refused
A. The Alleged Infringement Is Speculative or Inadequately Supported
A recognised category of right does not establish that the particular defendant threatens to violate it. An injunction application must connect the right asserted with a sufficiently demonstrated danger.
In Mst. Humaira Aslam v. Abdul Rahim Rafi (PLD 2016 Sindh 598), the plaintiff invoked easement rights against an adjoining development. The Court recognised that the suit was maintainable but declined interim restraint on the material before it, including the approvals and assurances concerning lawful construction. It emphasised that the existence of issues requiring evidence did not itself establish all three injunction requirements.
The distinction is between a credible threatened infringement and an apprehension that has not yet been adequately substantiated.
B. Monetary Compensation Would Provide an Adequate Remedy
Where the asserted injury is essentially financial and can adequately be repaired through a later award, an injunction may be unnecessary.
In A.H.M. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd., Suit No. 1722 of 2018, order dated 28 January 2019, the challenge concerned increased information-technology charges. The Court considered the grievance monetary and capable of compensation if the plaintiffs ultimately proved their case.
In Puri Terminal Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and others (2004 SCMR 1092), the Supreme Court went further in the circumstances of that tender dispute. Because the petitioner had also claimed compensation and damages as alternative relief, the Court held that section 56(i) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 was attracted, as an equally efficacious remedy was available, and it declined to interfere with the refusal of interim relief.
There is an important qualification: claiming damages does not automatically defeat every injunction application. Order XXXIX Rule 2 CPC expressly contemplates compensation being claimed. The question remains whether compensation adequately addresses the particular threatened injury.
C. The Applicant Has Concealed Material Facts or Acted Inequitably
Temporary relief is discretionary. Material concealment, misleading presentation or deliberate procedural manoeuvring can disentitle an applicant to assistance.
In A.H.M. Securities, the Court considered the plaintiffs’ intentional omission of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan significant because its approval was central to their challenge. The judgment explains that concealment, unclean hands and deliberate failure to join a necessary participant may justify refusal. The issue was not simply an innocent defect in the party array, but conduct affecting the Court’s exercise of equitable discretion.
D. Delay, Acquiescence or the Applicant’s Own Conduct Undermines the Request
Unexplained delay may weaken an asserted need for immediate intervention, particularly where the applicant previously accepted the arrangement or allowed others to act upon it.
In ATCO Lab. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pfizer Ltd. and others (2002 CLD 120), the Sindh High Court identified lack of promptness and vigilance among the considerations relevant to refusing an injunction. Delay must nevertheless be assessed in context; it is not a mechanical substitute for examining the nature of the right and threatened injury.
Section 56(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 separately bars an injunction to prevent a continuing breach in which the applicant has acquiesced. Acquiescence, delay in seeking equitable protection and expiry of the statutory limitation period are nevertheless distinct questions, although more than one of them may arise in the same dispute.
E. The Interim Prayer Is Disconnected from the Relief Sought in the Suit
The Court must examine the relationship between the proposed injunction and the substantive claim. Interim proceedings should not become a means of obtaining relief which the suit, as framed, does not seek to establish.
In Marghub Siddiqi v. Hamid Ahmad Khan and others (1974 SCMR 519), the absence of a prayer for perpetual injunction was an express additional reason for refusing the requested interim restraint. The decision highlights the need to frame the substantive and interlocutory prayers coherently. Its application must also account for the particular statutory basis invoked, including Rule 1’s property-preservation jurisdiction.
F. The Application Seeks Premature Possession or Other Exceptional Mandatory Relief
A prohibitory injunction restrains conduct. A mandatory injunction requires positive action—for example, restoring access or possession. The latter may alter the parties’ practical position substantially before trial and therefore calls for particular caution.
In Haji Ibrahim and others v. Abdul Qadir Lakhani and others, High Court Appeal No. 210 of 2022, the Sindh High Court examined orders involving replacement of locks and sealing of apartments. The plaintiffs’ asserted prior possession was insufficiently established, while the orders affected persons claiming occupation who had not been impleaded.
The Court explained that temporary mandatory injunctions are not absolutely prohibited, but require rare and compelling circumstances. Ordinarily, their purpose is restoration rather than creation of a new state of affairs. The intervention should be limited to what is necessary to prevent the demonstrated harm.
Consequently, a request effectively delivering possession or substantially granting the ultimate relief should not succeed merely because it is presented as an urgent application under Order XXXIX. It requires the stronger factual and equitable justification appropriate to its consequences, as illustrated by Haji Ibrahim.
G. The Proposed Injunction Encounters a Statutory Prohibition
Order XXXIX must be read with the substantive principles governing injunctive relief. Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 includes restrictions concerning criminal proceedings, proceedings before non-subordinate Courts, contracts not specifically enforceable, and circumstances where an equally efficacious usual remedy is certainly available, subject to the statutory exception concerning breach of trust.
A significant illustration concerns purely contractual employment. In Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. v. Ayesha Chowdhry and others, High Court Appeal No. 406 of 2023, decided by short order dated 27 February 2025, the Sindh High Court set aside injunctions interfering with disciplinary proceedings and related employment matters. It emphasised that the employment arose from contract rather than statutory service rules, and applied the restrictions on enforcing personal-service contracts through injunctions.
That distinction matters: a decision concerning contractual employment should not be applied indiscriminately to a case governed by statutory service rights. The source of the asserted right must first be identified, as the reasoning in Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. demonstrates.
Nor is section 56(f) the end of every contractual inquiry. Section 57 provides a qualified exception for negative agreements, subject to its requirements, including the applicant’s own performance of the obligations binding upon it.
H. The Order Would Confer an Unfair Advantage or Cause Disproportionate Harm
An injunction should protect a right, not give the applicant an unjustified advantage while litigation remains pending.
In ATCO Lab. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pfizer Ltd. and others (2002 CLD 120), the Court identified public interest, public policy and the danger of perpetuating injustice through an undue advantage as relevant considerations. Importantly, it refused the requested injunctions but required the defendants to maintain and supply accounts of the disputed products’ production and sales. The outcome illustrates that refusal of a broad restraint need not mean abandoning proportionate protection altogether.
Public procurement disputes similarly require attention to the legal foundation of the challenge. In M/s Faiz Scientific Company v. Province of Sindh and others, Suit No. 1521 of 2020, order dated 1 March 2021, the Court declined intervention where the applicant had not established a sufficient basis for impugning the tender specifications.
3. Ex Parte Relief Is Not Automatic
Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC ordinarily requires notice. Dispensing with it depends on delay defeating the injunction’s purpose and remains subject to specific statutory restrictions, including those concerning certain government and bank-pledge cases.
The practical importance of hearing affected persons is apparent from Haji Ibrahim and others v. Abdul Qadir Lakhani and others. An urgent request should identify not only the threatened harm but also whose existing possession or rights the proposed order would affect.
4. Refusal of an Injunction Is Not Dismissal of the Suit
The interlocutory decision and the ultimate merits must remain distinct. Mst. Humaira Aslam v. Abdul Rahim Rafi (PLD 2016 Sindh 598) provides a clear illustration: the Court accepted that the suit was sustainable while refusing the temporary injunction. A claim may warrant adjudication without warranting immediate restraint.
Accordingly, an unsuccessful injunction application should not automatically be described as rejection of the plaint or final defeat of the asserted right. Equally, an interim order in a plaintiff’s favour should not be presented as a final declaration of ownership, contractual entitlement or liability. The Supreme Court’s warning against deciding the merits prematurely in Marghub Siddiqi v. Hamid Ahmad Khan and others (1974 SCMR 519) is central to that distinction.
Conclusion
A temporary injunction should be refused where a required limb of the test is not established or where a statutory restriction or equitable consideration makes the particular order unjustified. Urgency does not cure an unsupported claim, material concealment, an adequate compensatory remedy or an attempt to obtain the substance of final relief without the necessary justification.
For the party opposing relief, the strongest response is correspondingly focused: identify the missing requirement, the relevant statutory restriction, or the inequity that makes the proposed order unjustified. The central question is whether interim protection is justified in the form requested—not merely whether the applicant has a case to argue.
For advice on seeking or opposing temporary injunctions in property litigation, corporate and business disputes or employment and labour matters, contact Legum Law Firm in Karachi.
This article provides general information on Pakistani civil procedure. Particular disputes require consideration of the applicable provincial amendments, substantive law, pleadings and evidence.
