A woman’s decision to end her marriage does not necessarily mean that she has chosen khula, nor does it automatically mean that she has agreed to surrender her dower. Recent Supreme Court judgments have repeatedly emphasised that courts must distinguish between a wife seeking release through khula and one seeking dissolution on legally recognised grounds. That distinction can determine whether she retains valuable financial rights.
The issue is therefore not merely one of terminology. It concerns the legal basis for ending a marriage, the evidence required, the wife’s informed choice, and the consequences for her haq mehr, or dower: the marital entitlement owed to the wife, distinct from dowry and bridal gifts.
Khula is itself a form of dissolution
Strictly speaking, khula is one mode of dissolution of marriage. It is not the opposite of dissolution. When the expressions are contrasted in Pakistani family litigation, the comparison is usually between judicial khula and judicial dissolution on statutory grounds, principally under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. The latter is also commonly discussed as faskh. Both routes may be pursued by a wife; the distinction is not that khula is initiated by the wife while dissolution is initiated by the husband.
The essential difference is that khula does not require the wife to establish a statutory ground of misconduct, whereas a decree sought on a particular statutory ground requires that ground to be established. The financial consequences may also differ substantially, as explained in Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan and others, PLD 2024 SC 645.
What is judicial khula?
Judicial khula enables a wife to seek release from a marriage where the marital relationship cannot continue within the limits prescribed by Muslim law. It should be distinguished from a privately negotiated khula settlement between spouses.
In Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Babu Muhammad Amin, PLD 1967 SC 97, the Supreme Court recognised the wife’s right to obtain judicial khula in an appropriate case without the husband’s consent. The husband’s refusal is therefore not a veto over judicial khula. In Dr. Faryal Maqsood and another v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani and others, PLD 2025 SC 262, the Court relied on the same authority for the converse point: khula cannot be granted without the wife’s own express or implied request.
But an equally important distinction follows: the husband’s consent may be unnecessary, while the wife’s own election of khula remains essential. A court cannot treat its power to grant khula against the husband’s wishes as a power to impose khula against the wife’s wishes. The remedy belongs to her, and its potentially adverse financial consequences make her choice especially important.
What is dissolution on statutory grounds?
Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 gives a Muslim wife grounds upon which she may obtain dissolution. These include the husband’s failure to maintain her for two years; failure, without reasonable cause, to perform marital obligations for three years; cruelty; and contracting an additional marriage in contravention of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Other grounds include his whereabouts remaining unknown for four years, subject to the Act’s particular safeguards. Not every statutory ground necessarily involves deliberate wrongdoing.
Section 5 expressly preserves the wife’s existing rights to dower. Consequently, obtaining dissolution under the Act does not, by itself, require her to surrender those rights. This is not an automatic award of every amount claimed: the court must still determine the entitlement, its terms, and any payment already made. The central point is that statutory dissolution is not conditional upon purchasing release through the abandonment of dower.
Recent Supreme Court judgments: courts cannot substitute khula for the wife’s actual claim
Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan and others, PLD 2024 SC 645
In Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan and others, PLD 2024 SC 645, the Family Court had granted khula and treated the wife as having waived dower consisting of a half-share in a house, although she had not sought khula.
The High Court subsequently found that the husband had already divorced her through talaq, making the grant of khula unnecessary, and restored her dower entitlement. The Supreme Court upheld the result and explained why a court cannot replace the wife’s actual claim with an unrequested khula decree. The legal requirements and financial consequences are different.
The case illustrates why the wording and substance of the wife’s claim matter: asking the court to recognise or bring about the end of a marriage is not necessarily an offer to relinquish dower.
Dr. Faryal Maqsood and another v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani and others, PLD 2025 SC 262
In Dr. Faryal Maqsood and another v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani and others, PLD 2025 SC 262, reported in 2025, the husband contracted another marriage without obtaining the required Arbitration Council permission.
The Supreme Court applied section 2(iia) of the 1939 Act, treating the unlawful additional marriage as the proper statutory ground for dissolution. It did not leave the wife with an unrequested khula decree and its adverse financial consequences. The Court also distinguished between an established statutory ground and allegations of cruelty that lacked an adequate evidentiary foundation.
This judgment demonstrates that a court must identify the correct legal ground, rather than assume that any wife seeking separation must necessarily be seeking khula.
The relevant permission is the Arbitration Council’s permission
Section 6(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 requires prior written permission of the Arbitration Council before a man contracts another marriage during an existing marriage. The existing wife’s consent and the Council’s permission are not interchangeable requirements: the application must address whether her consent has been obtained, but private consent is not a substitute for the statutory permission.
Section 6(5)(a) also makes the entire outstanding dower, whether prompt or deferred, immediately payable to the existing wife or wives where another marriage is contracted without that permission. These statutory consequences are separate from any question of khula.
Dr. Seema Hanif Khan v. Waqas Khan and others, PLD 2026 SC 91
In Dr. Seema Hanif Khan v. Waqas Khan and others, PLD 2026 SC 91, a 2025 decision reported in the 2026 law-report volume, the Supreme Court set aside the lower courts’ treatment of the case as khula. The husband’s additional marriage in violation of section 6 provided an independent statutory basis for dissolution, and the wife’s dower rights were preserved. The decision again rejected the assumption that filing a dissolution suit necessarily amounts to seeking khula.
The judgment also addressed a recurring evidentiary problem. Cruelty is not confined to physical assault, and allegations of mental or emotional abuse must be assessed in their marital context. Family litigation is decided on the balance of probabilities, not the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An absence of police reports, medical certificates or independent eyewitnesses cannot automatically defeat a cruelty claim.
Mst. Naila Javed and another v. Nasir Khan and others, C.P.L.A. No. 3767 of 2025
In Mst. Naila Javed and another v. Nasir Khan and others, C.P.L.A. No. 3767 of 2025, covered in the Sindh High Court’s January 2026 case-law update, the wife had pleaded cruelty and non-maintenance. The Family Court instead treated her unwillingness to cohabit as aversion sufficient for khula and deprived her of the remaining dower.
The Supreme Court rejected that approach. Her unwillingness to continue living with the husband did not constitute a voluntary election to surrender her statutory claim. The husband’s admitted non-maintenance and additional marriage without permission were legally relevant matters that could not simply be bypassed.
The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed. The marriage was dissolved on the ground of cruelty, the husband’s additional marriage without permission was also treated as an independent justification, and the wife was held entitled to Rs. 1,200,000 in remaining dower.
The May 2026 ruling: a conscious and informed election
A further Supreme Court ruling, reported by the Associated Press of Pakistan on 21 May 2026, concerned an appeal brought by Seelab Akhtar. It addressed the situation in which a wife has not proved her allegations of cruelty but remains unwilling to continue the marriage.
According to the report, the Court required the Family Court to obtain her clear, informed and voluntary choice before granting khula. It described this as the conscious election principle and remanded the matter for the necessary determination.
Failure to establish cruelty does not automatically authorise the court to impose khula and its financial consequences. Nor does the effective collapse of the relationship remove the need to ascertain the wife’s chosen remedy. The court must determine whether she elects khula or maintains her original claim, and proceed according to law. This discussion is based on the news report, not an independently obtained signed judgment.
Does khula always require the return of the entire dower?
A blanket statement that a woman seeking khula must always return every part of her dower is unsafe. The applicable legislation and the particular entitlement must be examined.
In Mst. Rafia Yaqoob v. Suleman Ayub, 2026 SCMR 561, decided on 23 January 2026, the wife had herself sought khula. Her admitted prompt dower was fifteen tolas of gold, and the marriage had remained unconsummated. The High Court ordered the entire amount returned, replacing the twenty-five per cent direction made by the Family Court and upheld on first appeal.
The Supreme Court restored the twenty-five per cent order, applying section 10(5) of the Family Courts Act as applicable in Punjab, under which a wife obtaining khula may be directed to surrender up to twenty-five per cent of her admitted prompt dower or up to fifty per cent of her deferred dower. Non-consummation did not justify disregarding that statutory provision. The wife had accepted the original liability; the dispute before the Court concerned its enlargement.
The Court also distinguished dower from bridal gifts and presents, rejecting the husband’s attempt to reclaim such gifts as his property. This was not authority for treating everything given at marriage as recoverable khula compensation. Equally, a percentage applied under Punjab legislation must not be assumed to govern every other province, including Sindh. The applicable provincial law and binding authorities must be checked in each case.
Cruelty must be assessed realistically—but still proved
Recognising that marital abuse often occurs privately does not mean that every allegation must be accepted without evaluation. It means that the court must use an appropriate civil standard and assess the evidence realistically, as explained in Dr. Seema Hanif Khan v. Waqas Khan and others, PLD 2026 SC 91.
The Supreme Court’s approach requires attention to the wife’s testimony, the surrounding circumstances and the cumulative effect of the alleged conduct. Persistent humiliation, coercion or emotional mistreatment may be legally significant even where no visible injury exists. Conversely, a conclusion of cruelty still requires a reasoned assessment of the record rather than an assumption that every unsuccessful marriage proves statutory wrongdoing.
The practical importance is substantial: an unrealistically high evidentiary threshold can push a woman towards khula simply because private mistreatment is difficult to document. The answer is a proper assessment of the evidence, not the abandonment of the legal distinction between statutory dissolution and khula.
What this means for pleadings and Family Court proceedings
The practical starting point is to identify what relief the wife actually seeks. A statement that she cannot resume married life should not casually be treated as an agreement to surrender dower. Where khula is proposed as an alternative, the instructions should distinguish her desire to end the marriage from her willingness to accept that particular remedy and its financial implications. This reflects the Supreme Court’s insistence, including in Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan and others, PLD 2024 SC 645, on respecting her choice rather than substituting a judicial assumption.
A statutory dissolution claim should set out the material facts supporting the relevant grounds, identify the available witnesses and documents, and make the financial claims clear. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 provides for material facts and supporting evidence in the plaint; it also permits a dissolution plaint to include associated claims concerning dower, maintenance, dowry, the wife’s belongings, custody and visitation. These matters should be identified distinctly rather than merged into a general request to end the marriage.
From a drafting perspective, clear instructions are especially important where a plaint contains an alternative prayer for khula. A routine clause copied from a precedent may fail to capture the client’s actual position. Counsel should establish whether she seeks adjudication of statutory grounds, elects khula, or wishes to preserve a carefully defined alternative. The recent judgments make that a substantive question, not a drafting formality.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence protects two related interests: a woman’s ability to seek an end to her marriage and her right to choose the legal basis on which she does so. Judicial khula remains an important remedy, but it cannot be used as a shortcut that bypasses a statutory claim and strips away dower without an informed election. A court must address the pleaded grounds, apply the correct evidentiary standard and distinguish the dissolution of the marriage from the determination of associated financial claims.
Wanting a marriage to end is not the same as agreeing to give up the rights arising from it.
Family-law advice in Karachi and across Pakistan
Legum Law Firm’s family-law practice advises and represents clients in khula, dissolution of marriage, dower, maintenance and related family disputes. For advice on the appropriate claim and the applicable provincial law, contact our lawyers in Karachi, who assist clients across Pakistan with correspondent counsel where required.
Research and scope note: This article concerns Pakistani Muslim family law and is general information, not advice on an individual case. Provincial legislation and the particular facts remain important. The May 2026 ruling is discussed on the basis of APP’s report of 21 May 2026; its signed judgment and formal law-report citation were not independently obtained, so no unverified case citation has been assigned to it. Case-report years should not be confused with decision dates.
